ABSTRACT Security equipment such as intrusion prevention system is an important supplementary for security management. They reduce the difficulty of network management by giving alarms corresponding to different attacks instead of raw traffic packet inspection. But there are many false alarms due to their running mechanism, which greatly reduces its usability. In this paper, we develop a hierarchical framework to mine high threating alarms from the massive alarm logs, and aim to provide fundamental and useful information for administrators to design efficient management policy. First, the alarms are divided into two parts based on their attributes, the first part mainly includes several kinds of famous attacks which are critical for security management, we proposed a similar alarm mining method based on Choquet integral to cluster and rank the frequently occurred attacks. The rest alarms constitute the second part, which are caused by the potential threats attacks, also include many false alarms. To reduce the effect of false alarms and rank the potential threats, we employ the frequent pattern mining algorithm to mine correlation rules and then filter false alarms. Following, we proposed a self-adapting threat degree calculation method to qualify the threat degree of these alarms after filtering. To verity the methods developed, an experimental platform is constructed in the campus network of Xi'an Jiaotong University. Experimental results based on the data collected verify the efficiency of the developed methods. For the first kind of alarms, the similar alarms mining accuracy is higher than 97% and the alarms are ranked with different processing urgencies. For the rest alarms, the proposed methods have filtering accuracy above 80% and can rank the potential threats. Based on the ranking results, administrators can deal with the high threats with their limited time and energy, in turn, keep the network under control.
I. INTRODUCTION
Capturing and analyzing the abnormal behavior is one of the most critical issues in keeping a network, data center or cloud under control. Firewall, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) are regarded as the most important devices for security management [1] - [4] . IDS and IPS are mainly used to detect whether there are ongoing attacks or not by comparing the packet payload with some specific signatures [5] . Usually one attack will generate many packets and one packet will generate one alarm, thus there will be many alarms corresponding to one attack. Also the packets have the strings same with the signatures will also generate alarms. Thus due to the running mechanism, equipment such as IPS will generate many false alarms, which greatly reduce its usability for actual applications, it is very difficult for administrators to utilize those massive alarms for security management policy design. How to mine useful information from the massive IPS alarms is a challenge task. Furthermore, generally there are thousands of alarms generated per second in a middle size network or cloud and it is very difficult to decide which one should be processed first. To solve those problems, we develop a hierarchical framework to perform high threat mining and ranking based on their processing urgencies, in turn, reduce the operating difficulties for network administrators.
Firstly, based on the operation experience of network management we divide the alarms into two parts: one part is consisted of some famous attacks. The attacks selected include the Denial-of-Service (DoS), SQL injection, Buffer overflow, Login attempt and Apache structs. To rank those attacks with processing urgencies, we develop a new alarm similarity calculation method based on Choquet Integral model to cluster all the similar alarms into one cluster, and the alarms are ranked according to the clustering results. To perform efficiency clustering, we select the time stamp, Source IP address and Destination IP address as the features for specific alarm. For different features we design different methods to calculate their similarity. As each cluster contains many alarms, we select the time stamp of the first alarm record found in the cluster as the start time of the corresponding cluster. While that of the last alarm as the end time. We employ those two time stamps to calculate time similar degree. For IP similarity, the similar degree is defined as the number of 1 in the subnet mask of the given two IP addresses divided by 32. Additionally, the Choquet Integral model is different from the traditional clustering method, the clustering results are different with different fuzzy measures. If we want to emphasize the source IP address, we can set a bigger measure for it. In this way, we can obtain the clustering results easily for different purposes. In this paper, we selected the fuzzy measure based on the network experimental experience.
Another part is made up by the rest of alarms, which include potential threats and false alarms, we need to filter the false alarms and then rank the potential attacks for efficiency management. IPS alarms are generated based on the matching results between the specific signature strings and the packet payload. The similar services provided by the cloud or network will generate similar packets with same payload, and the false alarms will generate frequently. Based on this finding, we employ the frequent pattern mining methods to mine the correlation rules among the alarms and employ them to filter the false alarms. The alarms after filtering are regarded as potential threats. To rank those potential threats, we proposed a self-adapting threats degree calculation method to qualify their threating degrees. For easy computation, we define six features to characterize the alarms. The Concentration Degree of specific Source IP address (CDS) is employed to capture the frequency of alarms from the same source IP address. The Number of Different Destination IP addresses of specific Source IP address (NDDS) is employed to characterize the range of alarms from one specific source IP address. The Different Destination Ports from alarms of specific Source IP address (DDPS) is employed to capture the number of different attacks from one specific source IP address. We also employ the Different Protocols of specific alarms from specific Source IP address (DPS) to capture the protocol usage of the specific source address. We also employ the Different Alarm Type of specific Source IP address (DATS) to evaluate the risk degree of the source IP address. The Number of IP address Response to the specific Source IP address (NIRS) is used to describe whether there are alarm responses from the specific source IP address. We employ the entropy weight decision making method to select the weights of those six features from the data and then obtain their potential threat degree.
Finally, all the alarms are ranked according to their processing agencies and threat degree. Based on the ranked results, the administrator can deal with the high threats timely with his limited time and energy, in turn, keep the network under control. To verify the efficiency of the proposed methods, we establish an experimental platform in the campus network center of Xi'an Jiaotong University. Performance evaluation results based on millions of IPS alarm logs collected from the platform show that our method outperform than the traditional methods. Most importantly we rank the alarms according to their threat degrees and processing agencies mined from the actual data, which is very helpful and useful information for the administrator.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II simply describes the relation work. Section III describes the framework of the mode. Section IV presents the mining process of high threats alarms. The mining process of potential threat alarms are proposed in Section V. Section VI analyzes the experiment results on the IPS alarm logs and conclusion then follow.
II. RELATED WORKS
Works on the false alarm filtering and high threats alarm mining can greatly improve the efficiency of security management, which attracts many researchers' attention. The related works are simply summarized as follows:
A. ALARM CORRELATION TECHNIQUE
Alarm correlation means mine the related alarms from the raw records, which is useful for attack investigation, such as path reconstruction. Salah et al. [6] and Dwivedi et al. [7] classify the correlation methods into similarity-based, sequential-based and case-based methods.
Zhang et al. [8] proposed the correlation analysis method based on similar degree of features. They extract source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, protocol type, and time stamp as features to calculate the similarity between different alarms, then they use a threshold to judge whether an alert belongs to an exist category or not. Valdes and Skinner [9] proposed a probabilistic approach for alarm correlation, which provides a unified mathematical framework for alarm correlation. They use feature similarity, similarity expectation and minimum similarity to decide whether a new alarm need to be classified or not. This kind of method is simple and do not rely on prior knowledge, but it is very difficult to extract suitable features and define the feature functions, otherwise it will generate many meaningless results.
To fully utilize the alarms, Ning et al. [10] proposed an approach to construct attack scenarios by correlating alarms based on alarm consequences characteristics. The correlation VOLUME 6, 2018 process tries to find relationships among alarms through their pre and post conditions. Cupprens and Miege [11] designed a cooperative module called CRIM for intrusion detection systems to reduce alarms, it uses a knowledge base and consequences to detection attacks. Although these sequential-based methods have high accuracy, it need many priori knowledge and cannot find the potential attacks. Sadighian et al. [12] proposed a context aware and ontology based alarm correlation framework which uses ontologies to present and store the alarms information, alarms context, vulnerability information and attack scenarios. They correlate and reason with information from various resources, they can also employ simple ontology logic rules to correlate and filter out non-relevant alarms. But the case-based method has less scalability due to their computational complexity caused by the context.
B. FILTERING TECHNIQUE
Usually there are thousands of false alarms per seconds and it is a very hard and time-consuming job for administrators to distinguish the potential threat alarms. Thus many filtering techniques are developed in the past decent.
Meng et al. [13] developed an enhanced filter mechanism (EFM) to deal with the issues about network packet overload, expensive signature matching and massive false alarms in a large-scale network environment. The enhanced filter mechanism has three major components: a contextaware blacklist-based packet filter, an exclusive signature matching component and a KNN-based false alarm filter. The context-aware blacklist-based packet filter can filter out network packets based on IP reputation, but it need have blacklist base in advance. The KNN-based false alarm filter can reduce false alarms and output true alarms, but it is sensitive to the value of the variable, and the complexity of the algorithm is also very high when facing lots of training samples.
Spathoulas and Katsikas [14] designed a post-processing filter to reduce negative effect generated by false alarms. The filter is consisted of three components: neighboring related alarms (NRA), high alarm frequency (HAF) and usual false positives (UFP). Although none of them can individually reduce false positives, the combination of the three components can deal with the false alarm efficiently. Spathoulas and Katsikas [14] proposed an intrusion alarm quality framework to reduce false alarm in IDS. This method enriches each alarm with quality parameters such as correctness, accuracy, reliability, and sensitivity to filter out false alarm. However, the method needs the labeled data for training. Pecchia et al. [15] propose a filter approach based on the log entropy scheme, the method uses the different text weighting schemes to filter massive of alarms in Cloud. The method can deal with unstructured data produced by security monitors. Cotroneo et al. [16] compares the filtering techniques, include blacklist, conceptual clustering, bytes and term weighting. They validate different filtering techniques according to comparison results to reveal the effectiveness of different filters. The results show that the technique of bytes has the most effectiveness, follows by term weighting, conceptual clustering, blacklist, and the findings will play an important guiding role in further research for security alarms. But how to rank the alarms are not mentioned in these works.
Focus on the above challenges and enlightened by the related works, we proposed a hierarchical framework to mine the high threats alarms and rank them based on their processing agencies, which can provide fundamental and useful information for administrators to decide which alarm should be processed firstly to keep the network under control with the limitation of time and energy.
III. FRAMEWORK OF THE METHOD A. OVERFLOW
Detailed overflow of the proposed methods is shown in figure 1 , as the figure shows the newly developed methods can divided into four steps: Step1: feature selection, one alarm record contains many features, some of them are redundant or irrelevant for threat alarms mining. We select some important features from the records, including time stamp, source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination port, alarm type and protocol based on the network security management experience.
Step 2: famous threat alarms mining, in order to deal with the alarms generated by famous attacks, we design a similarity mining algorithm based on Choquet integral, which can group the alarms into clusters and rank the alarms based on the clustering results.
Step 3: potential threat alarms mining, we use correlation rule mining algorithm to mine correlation rules, which are used to filter the false alarms. We develop a method to calculate the threat degree of the alarms after filtering and then perform ranking based on the degrees obtained.
Step 4: network management based on the results, different and efficiency network management policies can be designed based on the ranking result.
B. ALARM CLASSIFICATION
We simply classify the alarms into two categories for efficacious processing: alarms generated by famous and serious attacks, the rest alarms consist the second part. The famous attacks we concern include DoS, SQL injection, Buffer overflow, Login attempt, and Apache structs, these attacks are common and serious affect normal running of the network. The IPS used for experiment in this paper is HP TippingPoint, and each alarm in the IPS log is assigned with a unique number. The detailed information is shown in table 1 [17] . The detailed information of the DoS is shown in table 2, information of the other four kinds of attacks are given in the appendix. From the tables we can find that the attacks selected can cover most of the typical attacks occurred in the network today. 
IV. METHODS FOR THE FIRST PART ALARM PROCESSING
In this part, we cluster the alarms using the choquet integral model and rank them based on the clustering results.
A. CHOQUET INTEGRAL AND FUZZY MEASURE
Choquet integral model can not only fuse many alarms generated by the same attack into one cluster, but also can merge the alarms which generate by multi-step attack of specific intrusion [18] . Simple introduction of Choquet integral is shown as follows:
Definition 1 (Fuzzy Measure): Suppose the set X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } is a finite set, power set P(X ) of the set X is a δ-algebra, the set function of P(X )µ : P(X ) → [0, 1] is called fuzzy measure, and it must satisfy the below conditions:
Suppose µ is the fuzzy measure of X , X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } is a finite set, and f :
then we need rearrange the elements of X and can get the
Where A i = {x * i , x * i+1 , · · ·, x * n }, and f (x * 0 ) = 0. In order to calculate the whole similarity of two alarms we need set reasonable fuzzy measure values for these features. According to the network security management requirements and experiences, firstly we must identify the anomalies inside of the monitoring network to keep the monitored network under control, thus the source IP address should has bigger fuzzy measure. An attack usually generates alarms constantly, so the time similarity is more important for mining alarms belong to on specific attack. Therefore, the fuzzy measure value of the source IP address µ({SSrc}) should be bigger than the destination IP address µ({SDes}) and the time µ({ST }). We also give the fuzzy measure for the combination of features, µ({SDes, SSrc}), µ({SSrc, ST }) and µ({SDes, ST }). The fuzzy measure of combined should be bigger than the sum of its individual feature, e.g. µ({SDes, SSrc}) > µ({SDes}) + µ({SSrc}). If all of the features are combinedµ({SDes, SSrc, ST }), the fuzzy measure should be set to 1. Based on the above analysis, the fuzzy measure values selected in this paper are shown as table 3. 
B. SIMILAR DEGREE CALCULATION
We select time stamp, source IP address, and destination IP address as features to perform clustering, and their similarity calculation methods are given as follows:
1) IP ADDRESS SIMILAR DEGREE
For specific IP address, the similarity is represented by their distance R between IP1 and IP2, which is defined as the number of 1 in subnet mask M , which can distinguish the IP addresses in different subnets. R is calculated by XOR the binary values of the above two IP addresses, and set all the bits to 0 after the first 1 from the left and all the previous bits to 1. R is an integer between 0 and 32, the maximum value of R (MaxR) is 32 meaning two IP addresses are identical, while the minimal value of R (MinR) is 0 representing two IP addresses are complete different. An example of calculating R is given in table 4. 
2) TIME STAMP SIMILAR DEGREE
There are two time stamps of one specific cluster: the start time and the end time. The start time is defined as the time stamp of the first alarm which is classified to the cluster, while the end time is that of the last alarm classified into the cluster. The end time may be updated continuously using the time of the newest alarm. If there is only one alarm in the cluster, the start time and the end time are the same each other. We employ the time points of the alarm being clustered, the start time and the end time to calculate the time similarity, which is defined in (2) .
Where ST time represents the final time similar degree. While t 1 = |T new − T start | and t 2 = |T new − T end |, T start is the start time of one specific cluster, T end is that of the last alarm of the cluster, T new is the time of the alarm being classified, α and β are two weight factors. The time similarity is calculated based on (3). Where t min and t max are the time thresholds. If the variable t is less than the minimum threshold t min , we consider that the two alarms are identical, if the variable t is larger than the maximum threshold t max , there are no similar degree between the two alarms, otherwise, they will have some certain similar degree when t is the value between t min and t max .
We assign each cluster a unique identifier, when a new alarm being classified generated, we calculated the similarity between it and other alarms in one specific cluster, and select the biggest similarity as its final similarity of the cluster, if the similarity is bigger than one threshold, it will be classified into the cluster, otherwise we will judge whether it should be classified into other clusters, until all the clusters are calculated. If the being classified alarm does not similar with any exist cluster, it will be classified into one new cluster. We also assign a threshold for the number of alarms in specific cluster, if the number is bigger than the threshold, the cluster will be regard as bigger enough. We will remove it from the judging list. The detailed process can be described as follows.
Step1: When detecting a new alarm A 0 to be classified, the algorithm will extract the values of selected features.
Step2: Calculate the similarity degrees of A 0 and the alarms in the other alarm in one specific cluster, and select the maximum of them as the final similarity RM .
Step3: Compare RM with H , if RM > H , then the alarm A 0 will be classifier into the specific cluster, we use the variable A l .count to record the number of alarms in the cluster and A l .count+1, otherwise, the alarm A 0 will be classified into a new cluster and A l .count of the new cluster is set 1.
Step4: Compare A l .count with the threshold S, if A l .count is larger than S and the corresponding cluster is regarded as bigger enough and we remove it from the judging list.
D. CLUSTER RANKING
We rank the clusters based on their characteristics for network management easily. Generally speaking, the cluster with lager number of alarms are more dangerous, as the alarms in the same cluster are same or similar attacks, larger number means the attack occurred frequently and need to be controlled. Furthermore, if an attack only last short time period and generate many alarms, it should be processed timely as the attack process can be finished in a short time period. Therefore we select the size and frequency as the features of the clusters to rank the clustering results. We use the size to denote the number of alarms in the cluster and the frequency to denote the concentration of the attack. Based on those two features, the clusters are ranked and the alarms in the clusters with highest rank should be controlled timely to reduce their damages.
V. METHODS FOR THE SECOND PART ALARM PROCESSING
We first filter the false alarms using the correlation rules and then propose method to rank the potential threats.
A. CORRELATION RULES MINING
Based on the running mechanism and analysis in the section I, the most frequently occurred alarms in the second part are regarded as false alarms. Thus we can employ the frequent pattern and correlation rules extracted to filter the false alarms. The method used for frequent pattern mining is the FP-growth proposed by Han et al. [19] . We select source IP address, destination IP address, destination port and alarm type from raw IPS logs record to mine correlation rules. The values of those features are regarded as items and the alarms are treated as transactions. The support degree is an important parameter to be determined in this algorithm. The support degree reflects the reliability of the frequent item sets. The greater the support degree is, the more reliable the frequent item sets are. Firstly we read all the alarms to calculate the support degree based on the values of different feature, then we reorder the feature values of each alarm in a descending order. Secondly, we employ the feature values of each alarm as a node to construct the frequent pattern tree, the node will be inserted into the tree if its support degree is larger than the minimum support degree. Finally, we can get the frequent patterns of each feature as suffix by the frequent pattern tree. For efficacious calculation, the length of frequent pattern sequence is limited as no more than 20. We employ these frequent patterns to generate correlation rules and confidence, if the confidence is larger than the minimum confidence, which is selected as 0.7 in this paper, it will be selected as correlation rule for false alarm filtering.
B. FEATURES FOR THREAT DEGREE CALCULATION
We proposed six features based on the characteristics of the alarm themselves to calculate the threat degree, which are defined as follows:
Feature 1 (The Concentration Degree of Specific Source IP Address (CDS)): CDS shows the frequency of the alarms from the same source IP address, its definition is shown as (4). The variables starttime and endtime represent the start time and end time of the alarms from a specific source IP address, count means the number of alarms from the specific source IP address during the time window. To avoid 0 in the denominator, we plus 1 for the time interval.
CDS(t)
= count endTime − startTime + 1 (4)
Feature 2 (The Number of Different Destination IP Addresses of Specific Source IP Address (NDDS)):
This feature is employed to characterize the range of the alarms from a specific source IP address, and the definition is shown in (5), the variable diffDestIPCnt represents the number of different destination IP addresses for the specific source IP address.
NDDS(t)
Feature 3 (The Different Destination Ports of Specific Source IP Address(DDPS)): DDPS is used to capture the attack range from one specific source IP address, as an attacker may use different ports to attack some targets by scanning, and we definite the feature shown as (6) . The variable diffDestPortCnt represents the number of different ports for the specific source IP address.
DDPS(t)
= diffDestPortCnt count (6)
Feature 4 (The Different Protocols of Specific Source IP Address (DPS)):
The feature is employed to capture the alarm type of a specific source IP address. The definition of the feature is shown as (7), the variable diffDestProtocolCnt represents the number of different protocols for the specific source IP address.
DPS(t)
Feature 5 (The Different Alarm Type of Specific Source IP Address (DATS)): We can use the feature to evaluate the risk degree of a specific source IP address. As shown in (8) , the variable diffDestSignCnt represents the number of different alarm types for the specific source IP address.
DAAS(t)
Feature 6 (The Number of IP Address Response to the Specific Source IP Address (NIRS)): NIRS is used to describe whether there are alarm responses to a specific source IP address. And the formula is shown as (9) . destCnt means the number of destination IP address appeared in the alarms and speSipCnt represents the number of destination IP addresses which have response to the specific source IP address.
NIRS(t)
We use the six features to calculate the threat degree of each alarm as shown in equation (10), Where the variable feature j (j = 1, 2, . . . , 6) means the features of a source IP address defined above, and the variable weight j shows the corresponding weight factor of each feature, and subject to 
C. SELF-ADAPTIVE SELECTION OF THE WEIGHT FACTORS
The selection of weight factors in (10) is important for the calculation of threat degree. We employ entropy weight method to adaptively select the weight factors [20] .
Step1: we construct a matrix R which has m rows and n columns, m means the number of alarms, and n represents the number of features. Where the variable x ij shows the value of the i th alarm and the j th feature, i = 1, 2, . . . , m, j = 1, 2, . . . , 6. Step2: Obtain the normalization matrix B for the matrix.
where b ij is shown as (11) . x max and x min mean the maximum value and the minimum for the same feature.
Step3: We calculate the entropy of each feature. And the formula of the calculation is shown as (12) and (13) .
Where the variable H j means the entropy of the j th feature, f ij describes b ij accounts for the m samples. According to the VOLUME 6, 2018 definition of entropy, the logarithm of the variable f ij is not existent when the variable b ij equals to zero, and the modified formula is shown as (14) .
Step4: The weight of the features can be calculated by (15) .
The features should satisfy the condition,
The variable w j shows that the weight factor of the j th feature.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION A. DATA SOURCE
To verify the method developed, we established an experimental platform to collect the IPS logs from the campus network of Xi'an jiaotong University, which is shown as figure 2 . The IPS used in the platform is HP TippingPoint, and we employ the Security Management System (SMS) to operate the IPS. The network being monitored is the campus network of Xi'an Jiaotong University, which contains more than 20,000 end users with self-governed IP addresses, including students, faculty members and contract personnel from service providing companies. The daily used services including HTTP, Email, P2P, VoIP and etc., thus the network being monitored has high representativeness. 
B. SIMPLE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
We collect missive IPS logs based on above platform from May 8, 2017 to May 15, 2017 . For the alarms, we delete some alarms which have not complete feature information. We select four different time intervals which totally span 48 hours to verify our methods, there are two traces from day time and the others from the night time, in this way the traces used can reflect the difference of network running situations at different time points. Detailed information of the traces are shown as table 5. We first give some statistical results of the data used and the results are shown as figure 3 . The X-axis denotes different alarm types, and the number of the alarms corresponding to the specific type is presented by Y-axis. From the figure, we can find that the number of the alarms from Login attempt are the largest, followed by DoS, File Request etc., Login attempt is an important symbol for password crack, and DoS attack will occupy most of the available network resources and other legal users cannot use the service normally. We also find that the amount of the alarms of the five famous attack selected occupy more than 90% of the total alarms. In detail, the proportions of Login attempt, DoS, SQL injection, Buffer overflow and Apache structs are 59%, 35.21%, 0.85%, 0.68%, 0.14% respectively, and the dynamic changing trends are shown in figure 4 . As those statistical results show that we can deal with most of the alarms in the first step of our methods, which can also improve the accuracy of the potential threat mining in the following step. We also analyze the statistical characteristics of the five famous attacks selected in the four traces and the results are shown in figure 4 . We can find that the number of the alarms of DoS and Login attempt change sharply, which means those attack occurs randomly, we need monitor the alarms in real time for efficacious network management. 
C. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ON THE ALARM CLUSTERING
To perform clustering, we firstly set suitable parameters for the algorithm. Based on the management experience and the statistical results of the data, we assign the threshold H of similar degree as 0.61, the threshold S equals to 1000, the two coefficients α and β simply equal to 0.5 respectively, and the two time variables t min and t max are set as 10 minutes and 60 minutes respectively. Based on these parameters, we perform the clustering method on DoS alarm in the dataset T1, the results are shown as Fig.5 . The X-axis is the index for different clusters, Y-axis is the number of alarms in the clusters. From the figure we can find that the cluster with index 64 is the biggest one which contains 2066 alarms, with deep investigation we find there are 1076 alarms from the same source IP address 202.117. 16.20 to 121.194.7 .X in the cluster, 487 alarms FIGURE 6 . Distribution of four different clusters. VOLUME 6, 2018 in this kind of clusters as true alarms. According to above analysis, we use the entropy to evaluate performance of the clustering, the higher the entropy and the higher the accuracy. We also calculate the entropies of the four different clusters, and the cluster 0, cluster 3, cluster 11 and cluster 16 are 0.72, 0.93, 0.76 and 0.95 respectively. And we also give a minimum entropy, if the entropy of the cluster is higher than the minimum entropy, the alarms in the cluster are regarded as true alarms, otherwise, we should judge the false alarms of the cluster, and the alarms with the smallest number are seen as false alarms, based on the analysis results we assign the minimum entropy 0.91.
We compare our methods with K-means algorithm and DBSCAN algorithm. For the K-means algorithm, we assign the value K with the number of clusters generated by Choquet integral methods, and the different K values are shown as table 6. For the DBSCAN algorithm, we assign the parameters eps and minPts with 1.3 and 4 respectively, and the analysis results are shown as table 6 . Evaluation results of the accuracy is shown as Fig.7 . From the figure, we can find that Choquet integral method with the accuracy almost equal to 1. For DBSCAN method, the accuracy is very low while K-means algorithm has the accuracy between Choquet integral and DBSCAN algorithm. We also calculate the average accuracy of the clusters generated by the three methods for the four time intervals, and the results are shown as table 6 . From the table, we can find that the proposed method is the most effective. We employ the characteristics of clusters to rank them and mine highest threats. On one hand, we find the clusters with lots of alarms are dangerous and the source IP addresses of these alarms in the clusters should be processed timely. On the other hand, the alarms in one cluster may span a long time window, but we need apply the security policy immediately to reduce the negative affect of the attack, thus it is not enough only consider the size of a cluster. Thus we employ the frequency, which is defined as the number of alarms in the cluster divided by the time period, the size of the cluster is also used as an important feature. The results are shown as Fig.8 . From the figure, we can find that the cluster with more alarms may have a lower frequency. Although the cluster with index 64 contains more alarms than the cluster with index 18, we need to process the cluster with index 18 firstly. In this way, administrator can deal with the high threat alarms within his limited time and energy. 
D. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ON THE POTENTIAL THREATS MINING 1) FALSE ALARM FILTERING
We get lots of correlation rules by FP-growth algorithm in the format of IPsrc = 192.168.1.30, IPdst = 172.16.112.5, port = 161→signature = ''SNMP request udp'', which means an alarm about SNMP request udp has happened from 192.168.1.30 to 172.16.112.5 on the port 116. We use the correlation rules to filter the rest of alarms and the filtering results are shown as table 7. Where # of Filtered denote the total number of alarm filtered, # of False is the total number of false alarms which are correctly filtered. As the table shows, our method can filter most of the false alarms with high accuracy.
2) THREAT DEGREE CALCULATION
After filtering, we can use (10) to calculate the threat degree of the source IP addresses in the alarms after filtering. The results of the threat degree of the alarms are shown in Fig.9 . The X-axis is the index of different IP addresses while Y-axis is the specific threat degree. As the figure shows, 
VII. CONCLUSION
In order to effectively manage the networks for administrators within limited time and energy, we develop a hierarchical framework to process massive log data generated by IPS. To process the different alarms with different policies, we divide the alarms into two parts, one part of them is several kinds of serious attacks, and another part is constituted of the rest of them. For mining the high threat alarms from the first part, we propose a similar alarm mining method based on Choquet Integral, and we analyze the distribution of the alarms of the clusters generated by the method, and propose an evaluation method for the accuracy of the clusters, according to analysis of the accuracy of the clusters, we find that the accuracy of our proposed method is larger than 97%, the analysis results verify that the method our proposed is more effective compare with other methods, and we rank them with threat degree obtained from cluster size and alarm frequency. To reduce affect from false alarms, we employ the frequent pattern mining algorithm to mine correlation rules and employ them to filter out the false alarms. The analysis results show that the filtering accuracy is above 80%, and we can calculate the threat degree of the alarms remaining and rank them, and the ranking methods can report the most risk IP address. Based on the mining and ranking results, network administrators can deal with the high threats with their limited time and energy and keep the network under control. In the future work, we will focus on the methods for improving the filtering accuracy and the methods for selecting more suitable weight factors to calculate the threat degree.
APPENDIX
Detailed attack types of SQL injection, Buffer overflow, Login attempt and Apache structs selected to construct the famous attack type. 
